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Whether we conceive of it as a process of conjecture and refutation, abduction, inference to 
the best explanation, or in some other way, it seems clear that much of theoretical science 
proceeds in an essentially comparative or eliminative manner, choosing from among candidate 
hypotheses the one best supported by the evidence as that in which our credence will be 
invested.  In recent work I have argued that such eliminative forms of reasoning and 
justification leave even our best scientific theories open to the challenge that there may well be 
alternatives to them that remain presently unconceived but are nonetheless equally or even 
better confirmed by the evidence available to us.  Moreover, I suggest that the historical record 
of scientific inquiry itself should convince us that this most likely represents our actual 
epistemic predicament in science, for throughout that history we have repeatedly and reliably 
found ourselves unable to even conceive of particular alternatives to accepted theories that 
were nonetheless equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that would ultimately 
be discovered and embraced by later scientific communities.  In this paper I hope to at least 
begin to explore when this “problem of unconceived alternatives” does and does not pose a 
serious challenge to belief in the claims of our best theoretical science by considering an 
especially revealing biological example:  the hypothesis that fossils are the remains of once-
living organisms. For most of modern scientific history, I suggest, this claim was no more than a 
theoretical hypothesis vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives, but it is now a 
secure item of scientific knowledge no longer subject to any serious challenge on this basis.  I 
argue, however, that this change has not come about through the simple accumulation of more 
and stronger eliminative evidence in support of this hypothesis, but instead through the 
accumulation of evidence of a distinctive sort:  our primary support for the hypothesis of the 
organic fossil origins is no longer fundamentally abductive or eliminative in character, but 
instead consists in a kind of inductive projection.  We are able to directly observe and 
reproduce, in the field and in the lab, the very same processes that we take to have produced 
fossils from organic remains in past environments. We know the details of each of the various 
steps by which fossils are produced from organic remains in the present, and we are simply 
projecting the operation of that same causal processes back into the distant past.  I go on to 
discuss various ways in which this can and cannot be distinguished from more characteristically 
hypothetico-deductive forms of confirmation, and to draw several lessons from this case for 
disputes about scientific realism more generally.  Perhaps most interesting is the moral that the 
prospects for scientific realism appear considerably better in so-called “historical” sciences like 
geology and evolutionary biology, for it is surely in these sciences that we can most frequently 
gather evidence of this projective variety and thereby blunt the force of the challenge posed by 
unconceived alternative theoretical possibilities. 
 
